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Abstract—Airspeed sensor faults are common causes for inci-
dents with unmanned aerial vehicles with pitot tube clogging or
icing being the most common causes. Timely diagnosis of such
faults or other artifacts in signals from airspeed sensing systems
could potentially prevent crashes. This paper employs parameter
adaptive estimators to provide analytical redundancies and a
dedicated diagnosis scheme is designed. Robustness is investigated
on sets of flight data to estimate distributions of test statistics.
The result is robust diagnosis with adequate balance between
false alarm rate and fault detectability.
Index Terms—Aircraft fault detection, Airspeed sensor fault,
Fault diagnosis, UAV, Pitot tube defect, Adaptive observer,
Change detection
I. INTRODUCTION
A reliable measurement of airspeed is vital to many sim-
ple Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), since the envelope
of stable operation becomes narrow for simple autopilots if
speed information is in error. Simple UAV autopilots rarely
make use of redundant speed measurements both to avoid the
added complexity and due to limitations on weight. Ability to
diagnose speed sensor faults without adding additional sensors
or actuators to the aircraft would hence be very attractive.
Estimating speed by exploiting other sensors onboard could
be possible through state estimation techniques. An aircraft
can be described by a set of nonlinear equations with a rich
set of parameters, but as it is not feasible, to obtain complete
parameter sets for small UAVs, for reasons of cost, estimation
of states could be based on models where some parameters
are roughly known while others require identification. Several
parameters depended on states of the aircraft and vary as
the operational conditions change, so combined parameter
and state estimation would appear useful. When the structure
of nonlinearity is known in a nonlinear dynamical system,
and stochastic disturbances are not significant, adaptive ob-
servers for nonlinear systems may serve the dual purpose
of parameter and state estimation. When stochastic issues
become significant and local linearization around a state vector
is feasible, Extended Kalman filtering (EKF) techniques are
preferred. The literature on both approaches is significant.
Such estimation requires certain properties of the nonlinear
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system. Observability is essential, and this is treated for
nonlinear observers in [1]. When the system equations are
not simple and calculation of Lie derivatives of the system
equations are required, this can be cumbersome. A relaxed
approach is to ensure asymptotic convergence to zero of the
estimation error. For an adaptive observer, global asymptotic
stability can be analyzed employing Lyapunov stability results,
as done in [2]. Properties of the extended Kalman filter as a
combined state and parameter estimator was treated in other
classical results, [3] for linear systems and [4] for a class of
nonlinear systems. Once alternative estimates of aircraft speed
have been obtained, fault diagnosis could be achieved through
residual generation and change detection methods could be
adopted to obtain robust diagnosis.
Fault detection and isolation (FDI) has been demonstrated
for nonlinear systems with a structure similar to that of aircraft
propulsion in for instance [5], who used a sliding mode ob-
server, and in [6], where an adaptive observer was employed.
Fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR) for aircraft and
aerospace systems was studied in [7], that included nonlinear
control for recovery, in [8] where partial loss of control
surfaces was treated and overviews of theoretical diagnostic
techniques for general aircraft faults were treated in [9], [10]
and [11]. Goupil [12] showed how FDIR techniques are in use
in the Airbus 380.
Approaches to FDI for unmanned aircrafts were the subject
of [13], who treated actuator fault diagnosis and [14] who
developed multiple model adaptive estimation for sensor and
actuator faults. Extended Kalman filtering techniques were
combined with diagnosis to obtain fault-tolerant control in [15]
who also demonstrated detection of faults and degraded per-
formance of actuators using both simulated and real flight
data. The airspeed sensor problem was not dealt with in this
literature. A general structural analysis was conducted by [16]
for a non-linear aircraft model, and structural detectability and
isolability properties were determined. Classical diagnostic
techniques was shown, but on simulated data. Specific faults
and failure modes have also attracted considerable attention,
performance monitoring and detection of oscillatory behavior
was treated in [17]. Research on the airspeed sensor problem
using multiple sensors have been treated in [18] and [19] who
analyzed performance of linear time-invariant fault detection
methods applied on parallel airspeed sensors, but more general
results on airspeed sensor fault diagnosis have been sparse.
Larger manned aircraft use heating of airspeed sensors to pre-
vent icing but this is not always enough to avoid problems. The
final report on the Air France AF447 accident [20] states that
the pilots misinterpretation of faulty airspeed measurements
2was the leading cause of the incident. This has caused a lot
of visibility in the flight control system community towards
air speed sensor faults and alternatives to the use of classical
voting principles as sole means of fault diagnosis.
The present research started well in advance of the AF447
accident because air speed sensor signal faults and artifacts
have long been an issue on small unmanned aircraft. The
paper focus on the airspeed sensor FDI problem using non-
linear analytical redundancies. Early results [21] showed that
fault detection for clogging of a pitot tube was feasible but
used a simplified setup where wind was assumed known and
propulsion dynamics was known a priori. This paper presents
a complete solution to the airspeed sensor detection problem
where wind speed and propulsion dynamics are unknown. An
extended Kalman filter technique is adopted to the problem
at hand to estimate the wind velocity vector while flying and
propulsion system parameters and airspeed are estimated by
a dedicated nonlinear observer. The test statistics obtained
by generalized likelihood change detection is scrutinized us-
ing multiple flight experiments to obtain parameters for the
distribution of the test statistics, both in normal and faulty
conditions. It is shown how the parameters of estimated test
statistics can be used to determine thresholds for detection
that guarantee very low probability of false alarms while
ensuring adequate detection capability. A special methodology
is developed to avoid false diagnosis for return to normal,
which is a problem for an aircraft that experience uncontrolled
nonlinear behavior at the boundary of stability or in rapid
maneuvers. It is discussed how the diagnostic scheme could be
implemented as part of on-board avionics but also, as an added
benefit, be implemented as part of a mission supervisor on a
ground station based on aircraft telemetry. If a fault is detected
an alarm could be raised to let the operator take appropriate
action to bring it down safely.
The paper is structured as follows. Following a brief prob-
lem statement and presentation of selected parts of equations
of motion and propulsion dynamics, a set of residuals relations
are derived. To cope with parameter uncertainty and variability,
a non-linear high-gain observer is used to estimate the force
balance on the aircraft to get the expected speed from thrust
relations of the propeller. Wind speed is estimated by an EKF
and added to ground speed from an onboard GPS unit to get a
airspeed estimate. Robust residual generators are implemented
and validated using recorded flight data.
II. BANSHEE UAV SYSTEM
Research on fault diagnosis is often based primarily on
simulation studies, but the randomness caused by practical
conditions for unmanned aircrafts, including change of pay-
load, pre-flight trimming and control surface adjustments,
cause flight conditions to vary more than commonly captured
in simulations. The results in this paper are based on data
records from a large number of UAV flights under, most under
what are considered normal conditions, some are cases of real
faults that led to incidents with loss of aircraft.
This section gives a short introduction to the UAV from
which data originate. The aircraft is a Banshee drone from
Meggitt Defence Systems (UK), widely used for target practise
in several countries [22].
The Banshee UAV is a delta wing aircraft propelled by a
rear mounted engine. The thrust is delivered by a 2 bladed
propeller. It is launched from a catapult system (see Fig. 1)
and lands by parachute. It is not equipped with a landing gear.
Fig. 1. A Banshee UAV ready for launch. Photo: Danish Forces Joint UAV
Team
The aircraft has an avionics with an autopilot system that
is operated via telemetry from ground. A path to follow is
defined by a number of waypoints and speed to be followed
between waypoints. It is technically possible to fly the drone
manually and throttle command to control speed is feasible,
but when out of sight, remote command for attitude control
is difficult if not impossible.
A. Banshee Sensors and Actuators
In the configuration used for the tests in this paper, the
Banshee UAV was equipped with actuators and sensors, listed
in Table I, together with the associated signals.
The autopilot on this drone has a non-redundant architecture
and depends solely on individual sensor input to function
correctly. Only one sensor is present for each physical variable
and possible sensor artifacts or faults ripple directly to the
avionics. Faults on actuators limit the envelope within which
stable flight is possible. Calculating the flight envelope through
a linear matrix inequality problem formulation was pursued
in [23] and [15]. With closed loop speed control along a track
and attitude controller parameters being scaled by airspeed,
erroneous airspeed input will limit the flight envelope, in
particular when conducting sharp turns or other maneuvers.
Remedial actions on this UAV in its standard configuration
are possible only via telemetry from ground. If an airspeed
sensor issue is detected, the autopilot can be switched to a
mode without closed loop speed control; a less agile attitude
control can be selected to obtain better robust stability; the
ultimate fail-safe reaction is to stop the engine and release the
parachute. Activation of remedial action via ground station
command requires that the diagnostic result is available and
presented to the operator timely enough to intervene. Time to
detect, fault isolation probability and false alarm probability
are essential quality parameters that will be design drivers in
the sequel.
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LIST OF COMMANDS AND MEASURED OUTPUT
Symbol Unit Explanation
hp m Altitude measured by pressure
vpitot m/s Airspeed measured by pitot tube
λlat, λlon deg Latitude and longitude measured by GPS
vgps, ψgps m/s, deg Speed and course over ground from GPS
pi,qi,ri deg/s Roll rate, pitch rate, and yaw rate measured by IMU
ax,ay ,az m/s2 Body axis accelerations measured by IMU
n s−1 Engine revolutions
δT % Throttle
δa deg Aileron deflection
δe deg Elevator deflection
III. THRUST DELIVERED BY THE PROPELLER
The Banshee is propelled by a rear mounted combustion
engine with a 2 bladed wood propeller. The thrust developed
by this engine FT is given by kT , a non-dimensional thrust
coefficient, made dimensional by
FT = kT ̺n
2d4p, (1)
where propeller diameter is dp, shaft speed n, and ̺ the air
density. Wind tunnel tests (see [24]) of propellers of the type
used reveals that the thrust coefficient is approximately linear
with the advancement ratio J = v
ndp
, where v is inflow
velocity to the propeller. The thrust coefficient and NACA
data are plotted in Fig. 2. In nominal flight J is in the range
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Fig. 2. NACA wind tunnel test of two bladed propeller. Non-dimensional
thrust kT versus advancement ratio J .
0.9 to 1.1.
Propellers are usually characterized by their diameter dp and
pitch Pp. These values can be combined to a non-dimensional
pitch defined by P ′ =
Pp
dp
. The following scaling for the thrust
coefficient was proposed by [25]
kT (J) ≃ kT,ref(J − (P
′ − P ′ref)), (2)
where kT,ref and P
′
ref
are the thrust coefficient and non-
dimensional pitch of the reference signal, respectively. The
reference signals originates from different propellers tested
in [24]. The 26 × 32 propeller used on the Banshee has
P ′ equal to that of one of the tested propellers and the
characteristics of this propeller are used.
Calculating dimensional lift and drag on a propeller, it was
shown in [26] that thrust is related to advance speed v and
propeller angular speed n by the bi-linear expression
FT = Tnnn
2 + Tnvnv, (3)
which was shown equivalent to a linear approximation to non-
dimensional thrust
kT = kT0 + kT1J, (4)
where dimensional and non-dimensional parameters are re-
lated as Tnn = kT0̺d
4
p and Tnv = kT1̺d
3
p.
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR DIAGNOSIS
When three measurements of a compatible quantity Vk
are available, the classical Voting Scheme technique for fault
isolation calculates the three differences Vi − Vj , (i, j) ∈
[1, 2, 3], i 6= j. The measurements available on the aircraft
provide, at a first glance, three obvious redundancies, the
airspeed measurement vpitot, velocity measured by GPS and
compensated for wind vgps2air, and the expected velocity
vthrust obtained at a known shaft speed of the engine. This
gives rise to the parity relations shown in Table II, which
were also used in [21]. A ”1” in Table II means the residual
TABLE II
MEASUREMENTS AND VOTING SCHEME RESIDUALS.
Residual vpitot vgps2air vthrust
R1 1 1 0
R2 1 0 1
R3 0 1 1
is affected by the measurement, and since all three columns
have different column signatures, faults on each of the three
measurements could appear as easily isolable. The catch in
this argument is that vgps2air and vthrust are not independent
of vpitot: vgps2air need an estimate of wind velocity, which
requires the airspeed through vpitot; vthrust is dependent
on propulsion parameters, trim and loading conditions, and
parameter adaptation also needs vpitot. These apparent diffi-
culties are analyzed and overcome in the sequel of the paper,
and it is shown how a combination of estimation, adaptation,
statistical change detection and dedicated hypothesis testing
together can solve the robust fault isolation problem.
4V. RESIDUAL R1 FROM GROUND SPEED AND ESTIMATED
WIND
An estimate of the wind velocity vector is needed to create
residual R1 comparing airspeed readings: One from the pitot
tube system, the other being the sum of GPS measured ground
speed plus estimated wind vector. In [27] such an estimate
was developed with the purpose of calibrating the airspeed
sensor of a small UAV. Since this estimation algorithm is
simple and is shown to work well for an aircraft with the
same instrumentation as the Banshee, it is adopted here albeit
with a different end purpose, namely fault detection.
The aircrafts velocity relative to air vrel is related to the
ground speed vector vg according to the following vector sum:
vg = vrel + vw. The wind velocity vector is defined such
that it points in the direction the wind blow. The size of the
airspeed can then be formulated using the standard cosine rule
for triangles
v2rel = v
2
w + v
2
g − 2vgvw cos (ψw − ψg), (5)
where the wind direction is ψw and the heading of the aircraft
is denoted ψg . The relationship is illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Relationship between ground speed, airspeed and wind speed.
The pitot tube basically measures the dynamic pressure
of the wind flow based on pressure readings from a tube
pointing in the aircrafts forward direction and static vent on
the fuselage. Therefore, the pitot tube reading is a measure of
the forward speed u in the body frame (Appendix A). To take
differences between the measurement from the pitot tube and
the aircraft’s real speed due to attack angle, α, and sideslip,
β, into account, a factor between the two values also needs to
be estimated,
vpitot = cos (α) cos (β)vrel ≃ avrel. (6)
An EKF was used in [27] to estimate the wind vector and
a scaling factor. The dynamic pressure was available as a
measurement on the aircraft and was therefore used in the
measurement equation. For the Banshee the airspeed is given
as a velocity and (5) is used directly as measurement equation.
The state vector of the EKF is given by x = [vw, ψw, a]
T
and states are modelled as random-walk processes. This gives
the state transition
xk = Ixk−1 + νk, (7)
with νk ∼ N (0,Qk). The pitot tube measurement can
be estimated from the states by the following observation
equation based on (5)
hˆ(x) = a
√
v2w + v
2
g − 2vgvw cos (ψw − ψg). (8)
Since the ground speed and heading is estimated by the
onboard GPS receiver this observation equation can be re-
formulated as
hˆ(x) = a
√
v2w + v
2
gps − 2vgpsvw cos (ψw − ψgps). (9)
This leads to the following Jacobian
H =

a (2vw − 2vgps cos (ψw − ψgps))
2
√
v2w + v
2
gps − 2vgpsvw cos (ψw − ψgps)
a (2vwvgps sin (ψw − ψgps))
2
√
v2w + v
2
gps − 2vgpsvw cos (ψw − ψgps)√
v2w + v
2
gps − 2vgpsvw cos (ψw − ψgps)

T
.
(10)
The standard EKF algorithm (see eg. [28]) is utilized using the
above equations. This gives the following time update step
xˆk|k−1 = xˆk−1|k−1 (11)
P k|k−1 = P k−1|k−1 +Qk, (12)
and the measurement update is
y˜k = zk − hˆ(xk|k−1) (13)
Kk = P k|k−1Hk
T
(
HkP k|k−1Hk
T +Rk−1
)−1
(14)
xˆk|k = xˆk|k−1 +Kky˜k (15)
P k|k = (I −KkHk)P k|k−1. (16)
The covariances Qk and Rk are found from analysis of
segments of data during level flight. Alternatively they could
be estimated in the filter following methods suggested for
linear systems in Ljung’s innovations filter [3] and extended
to nonlinear systems in [4].
A typical development of the states for a flight is shown
in Fig. 4. The wind was measured on ground to be 6.8 m/s
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
0
10
20
Wind speed
Time [s]
[m
/s]
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
0
100
200
Wind direction
Time [s]
[de
g]
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
0.5
1
1.5
Parameter a
Time [s]
Fig. 4. Estimates of wind parameters during a flight at altitude up to 1500 m.
at 80◦, however, since the aircraft was flying at heights up to
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Fig. 5. Time development of the innovation of the EKF for same flight as
in Fig. 4.
1500 m the ground measured velocity was not representative.
The innovation of the filter is the difference between the
measured air speed component in the x direction and the x-
component estimated from ground speed plus the contribution
from wind. This innovation, Eq. (13), is used as residual R1
from Table II. With actual variables inserted
R1 = vpitot − aˆ
√
vˆ2w + v
2
gps − 2vgpsvˆw cos (ψˆw − ψgps).
(17)
The time-history of R1 is plotted in Fig. 5 for the same flight
as was illustrated in Fig 4.
VI. RESIDUAL R2 FROM ADAPTIVE OBSERVER BASED ON
PROPELLER SPEED
The second residual R2 in Table II is based on thrust
delivered by the engine and an associated estimate of airspeed.
This estimate is available through exploiting the dynamics, in
component form
mu˙ = m(rv − qw) + FAx −mg sin (θ) + FT , (18)
mv˙ = m(pw − ru) + FAy +mg cos (θ) sin (φ), (19)
mw˙ = m(qu− pv) + FAz +mg cos (θ) cos (φ). (20)
The aircraft’s motion is described by its linear and angular
velocities, vb = [u, v, w]
T
and ω = [p, q, r]
T
, in the body
frame, the euler angles φ, θ, ψ. The aerodynamic forces are
FAx, FAy, FAz and FT is the thrust forces derived in sec-
tion III.
The velocities are related to the relative airspeed, vrel, as
u = vrel cos (α) cos (β), (21)
v = vrel sin (β), (22)
w = vrel sin (α) cos (β), (23)
vrel =
√
u2 + v2 + w2. (24)
As the aircrafts fly with wings levelled most of time the
magnitudes of v and w generally are small so when calibrated,
the pitot tube provides a reading of the forward airspeed, hence
u = vpitot, (25)
and the velocity can be approximately described using only
the u term in (18). Since the aerodynamic force FAx is
unknown, this term has to be estimated by the observer. This
is done by adding an adaptation scheme to the observer. It
is customary to describe forces in terms of non-dimensional
parameters, for reasons of scaling, and it provides some
numerical advantage to use this representation in the adaptive
observer. The aerodynamic force in the x direction is,
FAx = q¯SCx =
1
2
̺v2relSCx, (26)
with q¯ being the dynamic pressure and S the surface area
of the aircraft. Cx is composed by lift CL and drag CD as
(from [29])
Cx = CL sin (α)− CD cos (α). (27)
Based on this the following model for FAx is suggested. It
contains two unknown parameters Θ = [Θuu,Θuuα]
T
to be
estimated.
FAx =
1
2
̺Su2 (Θuu +Θuuαα) (28)
This model depends on α which is not desirable because most
low cost UAV’s does not have a direct measurement of this
value. Instead a model only containing the velocity dependent
part is suggested. and if α is not available, the following one-
parameter approximation is used
FAx =
1
2
̺Su2Θuu. (29)
Both force models (28) and (29) was tested on real data
to see which one gives the best estimates for the purpose of
fault diagnosis. The Banshee does not have a vane measuring
α but an estimate is available from the autopilot. Using this
estimate in getting FAx from (28) does not give any additional
performance compared to (29). This could be because the
α estimate is inaccurate or the tested flight patterns does
not exceed the α dependence enough. Therefore the fault
diagnosis is done using (29) for FAx. Results from using the
two estimates are given in section VI-A.
The derivation is continued for the two parameter
model (28), but the results are valid also for the one-parameter
model by setting Θuuα = 0 in the following.
The model for FAx can be written as
FAx = m (F1(u, t)Θuu + F2(u, t)Θuuα) , (30)
where the F1(u, t) and F2(u, t) are defined as
F1(u, t) =
̺Su2
2m
, F2(u, t) =
̺Su2α
2m
, (31)
and m is pre-multiplied on the right hand side of (30) for later
convenience.
From the system equations (18), the following nonlinear,
adaptive observer is a natural choice for estimation of u. Let
uˆ denote the estimate of u and let L be the gain the observer
uses to update the estimate of linear acceleration from the
output innovation u − uˆ. The measurement of u is obtained
6from the pitot tube measured air speed vpitot according to (25).
Hence
˙ˆu = −g sin (θ) +
Tnnn
2 + Tnunuˆ
m
(32)
+ F1(uˆ, t)Θˆuu + F2(uˆ, t)Θˆuuα + L(vpitot − uˆ).
The pitch angle θ is estimate by the onboard inertial measure-
ment unit.
The unknown parameters are estimated using a standard
adaptive observer updating approach, (see e.g [2])[
˙ˆ
Θuu
˙ˆ
Θuuα
]
=
[
F1(uˆ, t)
F2(uˆ, t)
]
(vpitot − uˆ) . (33)
The estimation is initialized with values found during previous
fault-free flights. This ensures a fast transient period.
The extended state and parameter vector x of the observer
is then
˙ˆx =
 ˙ˆu˙ˆΘuu
˙ˆ
Θuuα
 =
 ˙ˆuF1(uˆ, t)(vpitot − uˆ)
F2(uˆ, t)(vpitot − uˆ)
 , (34)
and with parameters Θuu and Θuuα assumed unknown con-
stants, the error dynamics is
f(x˜) = ˙˜x = x˙− ˙ˆx =
 ˙˜u˙˜Θuu
˙˜Θuuα
 =
 ˙˜u−F1(uˆ, t)u˜
−F2(uˆ, t)u˜
 . (35)
For the diagnosis the error u˜ of the observer expresses
exactly what residual R2 from Table II contains, a comparison
between airspeed measured by the pitot tube u and an estimate
uˆ based on the thrust force delivered by the engine.
The observer gain L must be chosen high enough to ensure
that the observer is uniformly asymptotically stable. A stability
proof is provided in Appendix B. In order for the observer
to have good performance with respect to the fault diagnosis
it is important to choose a gain value that allows sufficient
deviation of the error value. Too high a gain could give an
observer that could track measurements, thereby creating fairly
weak detectability of a sensor fault, but also making estimated
parameters change so much that the parameter change itself
should trigger an alarm. When deciding whether to detect a
change from the observer’s innovation, or from the estimated
parameters, it is worth noting that the innovation is driving
the parameter updating, and a change (fault) in the generating
process or sensor is therefore first visible in the innovation.
It is hence a natural choice to use the innovation for change
detection when rapid detection is of prime concern.
Using model parameter adaptation together with residual
generation based on the filter innovation raises questions
about how and when the estimator itself need be updated
to changed conditions. Some techniques to combine change
detection with change in adaptation gains was treated in [30],
who demonstrated the combined technique on detection of
multiple changes, but the problem is an area of continued
research [31]. Aiming at fast online diagnosis, this paper will
halt adaptation when the output (test statistics) from a change
detector exceeds specified values, which are lower than the
chosen alarm threshold, and a special hypothesis test will be
developed to prevent false resetting of alarms.
A. Observer performance
The performance of the adaptive observer was tested using
recorded data from 18 flights with the Banshee UAV. Fig. 6
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Fig. 6. Observer performance and choice of model.
shows the estimated speed of the vehicle compared with
measured airspeed in the upper part of the plot and the
observer’s innovation in the lower plot. It is apparent that the
observer is stable and the standard deviation of the error, for
the given flight, is 0.23 m/s, which is satisfactory compared
to the 0.5 m/s present on the airspeed measurement when we
do not wish too high filtering (low bandwidth) in the adaptive
observer as this would delay fault detection.
The unknown parameters Θ behave, over time, as seen on
Fig. 7. Fig. 7 also shows that Θˆuuα drifts in value. This has no
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
−0.08−0.06
−0.04−0.02
00.02
Time [s]
Θ
uu
 parameter estimate (two estimated parameters)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
−0.08−0.06
−0.04−0.02
00.02
Time [s]
Θ
uu
 parameter estimate (one estimated parameter)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000
0
0.005
0.01
Time [s]
Θ
uuα
 parameter estimate
Fig. 7. Parameter development during estimation. The blue plots are the two
parameter observer which has σu˜ = 0.22 m/s and the red curve represents
the one parameter setup which has σu˜ = 0.23 m/s.
effect on the residual since its value is very small compared
7to Θˆuu and the reasons could include some change in trim as
fuel is consumed during the flight. Another reason for the drift
could be that the angle of attack, α, does not vary much and
sufficient excitation is not present to identify Θˆuuα without
drift. The one-parameter formulation (29) avoids this issue, it
is simpler and it’s innovation has very similar properties. The
two parameter observers standard deviation error is 0.22 m/s
compared to 0.23 m/s for the one parameter setup. The
parameter estimate using the one-parameter adaptation scheme
is shown in the middle plot of Fig. 7. The observer in the one-
parameter version
˙ˆx =
[
˙ˆu
˙ˆ
Θuu
]
(36)
=
 −g sin (θ) +
Tnnn
2 + Tnunuˆ
m
+F1(uˆ, t)Θˆuu + L(vpitot − uˆ)
F1(uˆ, t)(vpitot − uˆ)
 ,
and residual R2, which equals the observer innovation, u˜ =
u− uˆ, reads
R2 = vpitot + (37)(∫
g sin (θ)−
Tnnn
2 + Tnunuˆ
m
− F1(uˆ, t)Θˆuudt
)
−L(vpitot − uˆ).
VII. RESIDUAL R3 FROM COMPARISON OF VELOCITY
ESTIMATES
Following the voting scheme described in Table II the
third residual is the difference between the two estimates of
airspeed. Since both vgps2air and vthrust relies on the airspeed
measurement in their estimation procedures, it is impossible
achieve independence of vpitot. However, since the purpose
of R3 is to ensure isolability of the airspeed measurement
fault, its value is only required when R1 and/or R2 indicate
an alarm. With
R3 = vgps2air − vthrust (38)
= aˆ
√
vˆ2w + v
2
gps − 2vgpsvˆw cos (ψˆw − ψgps) + g sin (θ)
−
Tnnn
2 + Tnunuˆ
m
− F1(uˆ, t)Θˆuu − L(vpitot − uˆ).
and setting adaptation on hold when a fault is detected, R3
can be used for isolation. If an airspeed fault is detected,
vpitot can not re-enter in calculations that estimate vgps2air and
vthrust. These estimates will therefore after a while become
increasingly uncertain, which in turns affects R3. However, as
long as R3’s value is reliable up to and shortly after detection,
it serves the purpose.
VIII. CHANGE DETECTION
As in [21] fault detection is achieved by detecting changes
to the residual signals (17) and (37). Generalized Likelihood
Ratio Tests (GLRT) are used to distinguish between to possible
hypothesis about the residual signals.
H0 : x[n] = w[n]
H1 : x[n] = A+ w[n]. (39)
The H0 hypothesis is that only the expected noise is present
on the signal and the alternative H1 hypothesis states that
the signal has been offset from 0 by a value of A. If this
is the case there must be a significant difference between
the measurement and the model and hence a fault is present.
In Fig. 8 the histogram and autocorrelation of the residual
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Fig. 8. Residual from wind estimating EKF characteristics.
from the wind estimator is shown. The residual has been pre-
whitened and is uncorrelated with past samples as seen in the
figure. The histogram shows that as in [21] the noise on the
residual follows a Cauchy distribution with a general form of
p(x;xo, β) =
1
π
β
(x− xo)
2
+ β2
. (40)
The GLRT is based on the likelihood ratio between the
probability of the two hypotheses given a window of data
LG(x) =
p
(
x; Θˆ1
)
p
(
x; Θˆ0
) > γ. (41)
Here Θˆ1 is the Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) of the
parameters given H1 and Θˆ0 for the null-hypothesis. If the
ratio is larger than a certain threshold γ the hypothesis H1 is
decided. The two parameters of (40) are the half-width half-
maximum scaling, β, and the offset xo, respectively. Using
this equation the GLRT test statistics become
LG(x) =
∏N
i=1 p
(
xi; xˆo, βˆ
)
∏N
i=1 p
(
xi; 0, βˆ
) > γ. (42)
The MLEs of βˆ and xˆo are found by fitting the data to
equation 40. The window size N is chosen empirically. In [21]
the threshold for the detector was found by assuming the
performance could be calculated using a χ2 distribution for the
detectors, according to the classical theory [32], [33]. Dong et.
al [34] introduced a robust scheme for online fault detection
of additive faults on an aircraft when identification errors
exist in the model on which FDI is based. Other data driven
8approaches utilize observations on real data to characterize
the distributions of test statistics that are found to differ
significantly from the theoretical χ2 in real applications, see
[35] and [36]. This paper follows the latter approach and
instead of assuming a χ2 determined threshold, the distribution
of the test statistics, ie the LG signal, is determined for a large
sample of data known to have no observed faults. This makes it
possible to provide a reliable estimate of the PFA (probability
of false alarms) under H0. The idea to design tests based on
PFA under H0 was investigated in [37] for a CUSUM test
and in [38] for CUSUM and GLRT with χ2 test statistics.
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Fig. 9. Probability plots of the GLRT output for the fault free part of a
flight.
Fig. 9 shows the GLRT test statistics for a part of a flight
without presence of faults. The data are found to be best fitted
using a Weibull distribution
P (x; bw, kw) = 1− exp
(
−
(
x
bw
)kw)
. (43)
Estimating the scale parameter bw and shape parameter kw is
straight forward using an MLE or moment estimator method.
The threshold γ that will give a desired low false alarm
probability is obtained from the estimate of the distribution.
The MLE estimates of the parameters for 18 flights are shown
in Fig. 10.
Some flights have a more noisy residual and therefore also
a more noisy GLRT response. This is probably because this
flight is done at higher altitude and on a day with more wind
gusts, which doesn’t fit well with the constant wind model
used in the EKF. The fitted Weibull distribution is used to set
the detector threshold. This is done by looking at the right
tail distribution Q(x; bw, kw) = 1 − P (x; bw, kw) to find the
probability of exceeding a chosen threshold.
Due to differences the athmospheric conditions as well
as differences between aircraft and flight-pattern there is a
variation on the distribution parameters. In Fig. 10 MLEs for
the Weibull parameters for 18 different test flights show that
the shape parameter kw is fairly constant among these flights.
The scale parameter bw however, varies with the conditions
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Fig. 10. Maximum likelihood estimates of Weibull parameters for different
flights together with 99% confidence boundaries (red arrows).
met during the individual flights. By scaling test statistic
data with the estimates of bw, it is hence possible to get
a quite homogeneous set of test statistics data from which
a suitable threshold can be found. The right tail probability
Q(x; bw, kw) = 1− P (x; bw, kw) gives the probability of ex-
ceeding a chosen threshold. The 0.9999 level in the probability
plots give PFA = 0.0001.
PFA = Q(γ; bw, kw)⇒ γ = bw (− ln (PFA))
1
kw . (44)
With sampling time TS ≃ 0.1s, choosing γ1 = 3000 will give
a false alarm probability of 0.003% per hour of flight for the
data from Fig 10 (bw = 19 and kw = 0.6). This might even be
a conservative choice since data does not follow the Weibull
distribution in the high end of the probability plot in Fig. 9.
The threshold to be selected for a chosen false alarm rate
is clearly higher in conditions with high levels of wind turbu-
lence. An alternative to a fixed threshold could be development
of an adaptive threshold. This has been done for CUSUM-like
tests and for χ2 type test statistics in [39]. Similar results are
not available for a GLRT and Weibull distributed test statistics.
The residual from (35) is treated in a similar way to find
parameters for a suitable GLRT detector and a threshold of
γ2 = 100 is found to give an acceptably low false alarm rate,
below 0.003/h for the worst case level of disturbances. If a
less conservative calculation was made based on the mean of
the Weibull parameters a threshold of γi/2 would give a false
alarm rate of around 0.0004/h. The conservative choice of
threshold is used because of the large variation between the
noise of the different flights makes it too risky to provide with
the lower bound.
Since both residual R1 and R2 are based on estimators
that uses vpitot in their error values, it is important to stop
estimation when a fault on vpitot is detected. Each of the
estimators are stopped when its corresponding GLRT output
reaches a certain fraction of the alarm threshold, a value
of γi/2 was used here. Choosing a lower boundary for this
than the alarm threshold has two important advantages. First
R3, which is based on the difference of the two estimates,
9is independent of vpitot some samples before an alarm is
triggered such that isolation is possible. Second, the chance of
adapting to a faulty state is lower because adaption is stopped
sooner after the fault.
A. Detection Probability
Detection probability PD is much more difficult to assess
than the false alarm probability PFA due to the sparsity of
data where faults are present, the H1 cases. A single recorded
case of a pitot sensor fault is available but the duration of the
fault is fairly short, since the event caused the UAV to get
into uncontrolled conditions that led to a crash. There is no
ground truth available of when to declare the start of a H1
condition, so the statistical assessment of PD that follows is
fairly uncertain.
B. Test statistics for the H1 case
A portion of data for the faulty case is analyzed in this
section. The data belongs to the part where the GLRT detectors
chooses hypothesis H1. Even though the amount of data is
small they could give an indication of detection probability
given the thresholds chosen from the H0 data. The data is
taken from the point where the fault is first deemed present
on the data to three seconds before the first zero crossing of
the residual. This slice of data covers the flight where the
operator still would able to safe the aircraft and is therefore
the most interesting for detection. Fig. 11 shows a probability
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Fig. 11. Plot of the GLRT output in the H1 case for R1. The red line
indicates the threshold γ1.
plot of the data in this H1 case for R1. A Gumbel distribution
is fitted to the data and shown in the plot. With the chosen
threshold, and the chosen data segment, PD is 85%. This is
very satisfactory considering the noise level on the different
measurements.
Another essential aspect is which effect the fault might on
the flight envelope and derived from this on the operability
and the survivability of the aircraft. Coverage, the probability
of being able to detect and recover from a fault, was treated
in [40], and fault masking in [41]. Methods to verify and test
for robust performance under different conditions of faults was
the subject of [42].
The impact of the airspeed sensor fault is related to the level
(magnitude) of faults that could be hidden below a threshold
for the GLR tests. If the avionics and aircraft together have
robust performance within this level, diagnostic performance
could be considered satisfactory.
C. Detector performance
The detection algorithm is verified by adding a number of
artificial faults to real data from flights with similar properties
as shown in Fig. 10. In this way, the actual noise of the system
is preserved. The simulated fault is added to the airspeed
measurement v∗pitot = vpitot + f and the faulty value v
∗
pitot
is passed on to the detection system. The following fault
scenarios were tested. A stepwise fault
f =
{
f = 0 t < Tf
f = As t ≥ Tf
, (45)
and ramp fault
f =

f = 0 t < Tf
f = srt t ∈
[
Tf ;Tf +
Ar
sr
]
f = Ar t > Tf +
Ar
sr
(46)
Faults below a certain magnitude will not be detected as
these are considered within the limits of the normal noise
and disturbances on the system. The lower limits of what is
achievable to detect is reported in Table III. Residual R1 has
TABLE III
LOWER LIMITS FOR DETECTION FOR R1 AND R2 .
Residual As Ar sr
R1 6.5 m/s 7.5 m/s 0.50
R2 4.8 m/s 5.0 m/s 0.35
worse performance than R2 because a relatively high threshold
is needed on this residual to take wind gust into account. To
raise the certainty of a fault before an alarm is triggered, both
residuals should indicate a H1 condition before this is reported
to the operator. The values determined for R1 are hence those
that determine the actual performance of the diagnosis system
with fixed threshold. It is seen that a deviation in speed
measurement of about 13% need be tolerable by the control
system. This is reasonable for practical design.
The minimal time available to detect a fault is also impor-
tant, however in the setup where the diagnosis system serves
as an aid to the UAV operator the reaction time of this operator
plays a major role. Practical experiences with airspeed faults
for the Banshee drone indicate that the measurement error
on the pitot tube builds up gradually over time as the fault
progresses. This means that it takes some time before the fault
reaches a level that is critical to the flight of the aircraft, but
also that the detection time is longer. A sudden change in
value will become critical sooner, but is also easier to detect.
Practical experiences have shown that the time elapsed from
the fault begins until control of the aircraft is lost is around
200 s. This observation is based on the loss of several drones,
presumably caused by airspeed sensor faults, but only one
incident was scrutinized in the detail reported here.
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D. Real-time implementation
In order to run the diagnosis online, while flying, the system
must be running fast enough to keep up with the telemetry
datastream coming from the aircraft at 10 Hz-12 Hz. Since the
system is intended to be running on ground and not onboard
the aircraft standard PC hardware can be used. The EKF used
for wind estimation is a straight forward implementation since
the direct expressions for the derivatives are available. The
non-linear observer representation must be discretized in order
to run on the computer. This is done using a 4th order Runge
Kutta method to approximate the differential equations. The
heaviest process is generating test statistics used for the GLRT.
Finding the MLE for the Cauchy distribution for a window of
data is done by optimization. By using the MLE’s from the
previous data window as initialization parameters for the next
data window, this is fast. Running the steps of the algorithm
at the specified rate is therefore not an issue.
If the system should run onboard the aircraft it might be
necessary to decrease systems load since limited processing
power is available here. Also the data is available at a higher
rate and thereby increasing the load of the algorithm. However
since this is not the intended use of this diagnosis system this
is not pursued any further.
E. Detection of real fault
Data from a real incident where the pitot tube gets clogged
is used to test the behavior of the detection system. Velocities
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Fig. 12. Airspeed and GPS velocity for a flight where pitot tube clogging
occurs.
measured by the pitot tube (airspeed) and the GPS (ground
speed) are shown in Fig. 12. The figure shows that the two
measurements follow each other relatively well until around
2140 s into the flight. There is some variation due to the wind
and since the aircraft is flying in a square trajectory the effect
of this is changing. The aircraft is controlled using airspeed
which is why the pitot tube measurement is stable while the
GPS velocity fluctuates. Around t = 2140 s into the flight a
high increase in GPS velocity compared to airspeed is seen.
This is where the pitot tube measurement fails. Because the
autopilot controls the aircraft as it was flying at its nominal
speed a maneuver done around t = 2333 s exceeds the flight
envelope and control of the aircraft is lost. The operator could
have intervened and the aircraft saved had he been made aware
that the pitot tube measurement was faulty.
The air data from the aforementioned flight was fed to the
diagnosis system. The time development of three residuals
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Fig. 13. All three residuals development for the faulty flight data. The vertical
dashed line indicate the beginning of the fault.
described in Table. II is shown in Fig. 13 with an indication
of the faults starting point. As expected a large response is
seen on R1 and R2 which both triggers an alarm. A small
variation is also observed in R3. This is a consequence of
the two airspeed estimators starting running open loop as the
airspeed measurement is assessed being faulty. This means that
after a while the estimates will diverge.
In Fig. 14 and 15 the resulting GLRT output is shown.
Fig. 14 is residual R1 originating by the wind estimating
EKF. Note that the actual flight starts at t = 1100 s and the
diagnosis is initialized a while after this to allow for estimated
parameters to settle. With the chosen threshold detection is
done at t = 2204 s, which is about 64 s from the first signs of
the fault is seen. More importantly this is around 130 s before
control over the aircraft is lost and therefore well within the
operators reaction time.
In Fig. 15 the GLRT output and decision signal for R2, the
residual from the observer is shown. As seen the detection
happens at t = 2202 s and is therefore in the same range as
R1 and well within reasonable time for the operator to react.
IX. HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR RESET TO NORMAL
Resetting to normal could be essential for airspeed sensor
faults if caused by icing. Testing for return to normal, the H0
condition is confirmed in a classical setting when performing
a CUSUM sequential test where a hypothesis H0 : Ri =
µ0 + w(k); µ0 ≤ µtest where µtest is a limit for declaring
condition as normal. For GLRT, a test can be made that the test
statistics remains below a specified threshold. These standard
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Fig. 14. GLRT output and decision signal from R1. The alarm is raised
at t = 2204 s. The solid horizontal line is the threshold for alarms and the
dashed line is the threshold for stopping estimation.
1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400
0
50
100
150
200
Time [s]
R
2 
G
LR
T 
ou
tp
ut
1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400
−1
0
1
2
Time [s]
D
et
ec
to
r
Fig. 15. GLRT output and decision signal from R2. The alarm is raised
at t = 2202 s. The solid horizontal line is the threshold for alarms and the
dashed line is the threshold for stopping estimation.
approaches for confirmation of reset to normal fall short when
the aircraft makes maneuvers, when reaching the limits of
flight envelope, where faulty readings of speed shortly coincide
with the estimates. This is seen in the time-history plots as
instants after the fault occurred where residuals cross zero at
a certain rate to change sign and the GLRT detector(s) cross
the detection threshold.
A. Residual zero-crossing
This phenomenon is caused by the residual value crossing
zero and changing sign. For a short period of time H0 will
be considered true if only the residual is considered. To cope
with this issue, the derivative of the residual is also taken into
account. The zero crossing is characterized by a high value
of the residuals derivative which is different from what would
happen if the residual went back to a zero value. The derivative
of the residual can be estimated by the slope a straight line
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Fig. 16. GLRT output and decision signal from R3.
approximation over a small window. Doing this moderates the
noise influence.
Using least squares regression the derivative estimate over
a window of size N is given by
̂˙R1 =
N
∑
n∈N
t(n)R1(n)−
∑
n∈N
t(n)
∑
n∈N
R1(n)
N
∑
n∈N
t(n)2 −
∑
n∈N
t(n)
∑
n∈N
t(n)
. (47)
The same expression is used to create
̂˙R2. Combining the
derivative with its matching residual in vector form R1 =[
R1
̂˙R1]T gives the desired properties.
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Fig. 17. Residual R1 versus
̂˙R1. The red ellipsis indicates the boundary of
fault free behavior.
The trajectories of R1 and
̂˙R1 are shown in Fig. 17 for a
time-slice before and after the fault occurs. An ellipsis in the
center shows the part of the phase plane to which the signal
should be within to be considered fault free.
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The vector based detection is only used when the alarm is
already raised to make to signal strongly detectable and not
sensitive towards residual zero crossings. The vector based
setup could be used in detecting faults but the derivative part
is very sensitive to noise so the risk of false alarms would
be greater. Since the scalar based setup is more robust this is
used instead.
In most of the practical cases where a fault is discovered
in the airspeed measurement system, the aircraft would be
brought down in a controlled manner as quickly as possible.
In these cases there is no value of being able to detect whether
the system returns to a fault free state or not and therefore a
suitable hysteresis curve around the residual would be enough
to reject the zero crossings. However, in some cases the fault
is due to icing of the pitot tube and reducing the altitude to
a warmer level might recover from the fault. In this case it is
essential to be certain that normal behavior is restored.
The formal test quantity R4 is
H0 : R4 =
(
R1
Rt
1
)2
+
 ̂˙R1
R˙t
1
2 ≤ 1, (48)
where Rt1 and R˙
t
1 are the axes of the ellipse constraining the
normal operation range in Fig. 17. A formal change detection
test is easily derived for R4 to confirm return to normal. The
condition from this test should be present simultaneously with
the H0 from the GLRTs on R1 to R3 to confirm return to
normal from an airspeed sensor fault.
X. CONCLUSION
Fault diagnosis of the airspeed measurement system for
small fixed wing UAV’s was considered in this paper. A
diagnosis setup based on standard UAV sensor readings and a
basic thrust model were suggested using ground speed from
an onboard GPS unit. Two supplemental estimates of air
speed were obtained to calculate residuals. Wind speed and
direction were estimated to provide one such estimate when
adding the ground speed vector. The second airspeed estimate
was obtained from thrust-speed curves employing a non-linear
adaptive observer to estimate the engine thrust.
A hypothesis test based on GLRT was designed using
past flight-data recordings to find detection thresholds to give
desired low probability of false alarms. Tuning, in this way, to
the physical noise and disturbances on the aircraft, this ensured
a very low false alarm rate. Detection probability was analyzed
from flight data where a genuine fault occurred and detector
design was suggested to be based on balancing estimated
false alarm and detection probabilities. For a recorded case
of a genuine fault, that later caused a crash of the UAV,
detection was obtained with 85% of the data exceeded the
chosen threshold after the anticipated onset.
The method was verified both using simulated faults and the
real data from an UAV lost due to an airspeed sensor fault.
The simulation shows that, with the false alarm rate chosen,
that speed sensor faults exceeding 6.5 m/s are guaranteed
detectable, which was judged to be an acceptable level that can
be handled within robustness limits for conventional autopilot
controls. With false alarm rate below 0.003/h with normal
wind disturbances, detection of the real life fault was achieved
130 s before radio contact was lost with the aircraft. This time
window would leave ample time for the operator to react and
bring the aircraft down safely.
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APPENDIX
A. Reference frames
1) Earth fixed earth centred frame (ECEF): A right-hand
frame with origin at the Earth center. The x-axis is ex-
tended through the intersection between the prime-median and
Equator and the z-axis points towards the north pole. GPS
measurements are given in this system.
2) Vehicle carried earth frame: Standard North, East,
Down system following the air vehicle around on the surface
on the earth reference ellipsoid.
3) Body frame: The axes are coinciding with the aircraft
body regardless of attitude and has origin in the aircraft center
of mass. The x-axis is forward through the aircraft’s nose, the
y-axis to the right, and the z-axis pointing out of the belly.
4) Wind frame: Is centered at the aircraft’s center of mass,
and has its x-axis along the relative direction of wind. The
angle of attack α and the side slip angle β describe a rotation
from wind frame to body frame.
B. Observer Stability Proof
The lower bound for the observer gain is derived in this
section. To start with the gain functions used for the adaptive
parameters Θuu and Θuuα are assumed Lipschitz according
to the following relations
‖F1(u, t)− F1(u¯, t)‖ ≤ γ1‖u− u¯‖, (49)
‖F2(u, t)− F2(u¯, t)‖ ≤ γ2‖u− u¯‖. (50)
The assumptions in (49) and (50) is valid because the physical
values of the aircraft are bounded in the following way
u ∈ [0;umax] ,
α ∈ [αmin;αmax] ,
n ∈ [0;nmax] .
Applying the expressions for F1(u, t) and F2(u, t) in (31) the
following Lipschitz constants are found
γ1 =
̺Sumax
m
, γ2 =
̺Sαmaxumax
m
. (51)
For the observer to be asymptotic stable the error x˜ = x−
xˆ = 0. For this to be true a Lyapunov function V(x˜) must
satisfy theorem 4.8 in [43]. This states that the following must
be satisfied.
1) Uniform asymptotic stability: Let x = 0 be an equi-
librium point for x˙ = f(x, t) and D ⊂ Rn be a domain
containing x = 0. Let V : [0;∞[×D → R be a continuously
differentiable function such that
W1(x) ≤ V(x, t) ≤W2(x) (52)
and
∂V
∂t
+
∂V
∂x
f(x, t) ≤ 0, (53)
∀t ≥ 0 and ∀x ∈ D where W1(x) and W2(x) are continuous
positive definite functions on D. Then, x = 0 is uniformly
asymptotically stable.
The following function is chosen as a Lyapunov function
candidate
V(x˜, t) = x˜TP x˜, (54)
where P is a diagonal matrix with trace [a, b, c] where a, b
and c are elements of size 1 with units to allow addition of
the terms in the quadratic form Eq. 54. These unit conversion
factors are disregarded in the derivation below.
V(x˜, t) = x˜Tx˜ = u˜2 + Θ˜2uu + Θ˜
2
uuα. (55)
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Choosing the positive definite functions
W1(x˜) =
1
2
V(x˜, t) and W2(x˜) = 2V(x˜, t),
satisfy (52). The time derivative of V(x˜) is zero because no
explicit time dependence is present
∂V
∂t
= 0. (56)
The state derivative of V(x˜) is
∂V
∂x˜
f(x˜, t) =
[
2u˜ 2Θ˜uu 2Θ˜uuα
]
f(x˜, t) (57)
= 2u˜ ˙˜u+ 2Θ˜uu
˙˜Θuu + 2Θ˜uuα
˙˜Θuuα.
From this (53) becomes
2u˜ ˙˜u+ 2Θ˜uu
˙˜Θuu + 2Θ˜uuα
˙˜Θuuα ≤ 0. (58)
The expression for ˙˜u given in (35) was
˙˜u =
(
Tnun
m
− L
)
u˜+ F1(u, t)Θuu (59)
−F1(uˆ, t)Θˆuu + F2(u, t)Θuuα − F2(uˆ, t)Θˆuuα
Inserting in (58)
2u˜
((
Tnun
m
− L
)
u˜+ F1(u, t)Θuu (60)
−F1(uˆ, t)Θˆuu + F2(u, t)Θuuα − F2(uˆ, t)Θˆuuα
)
+2Θ˜uu
˙˜Θuu + 2Θ˜uuα
˙˜Θuuα.
This gives
2u˜
((
Tnun
m
− L
)
u˜+ F1(u, t)Θuu − F1(uˆ, t)Θuu (61)
+F2(u, t)Θuuα − F2(uˆ, t)Θuuα)
+ 2Θ˜uu
˙˜Θuu + 2Θ˜uuα
˙˜Θuuα
+2u˜F1(uˆ, t)Θ˜uu + 2u˜F2(uˆ, t)Θ˜uuα
≤ 2u˜
((
Tnun
m
− L
)
u˜+ γ1‖u˜‖max (‖Θuu‖)
+γ2‖u˜‖max (‖Θuuα‖)) .
As seen above having the adaptive gains as functions F1 and
F2 as suggested in [2] simplifies the derivation significantly.
The above equation should according to (53) be compared to
2u˜
((
Tnun
m
− L
)
u˜+ γ1‖u˜‖max (‖Θuu‖) (62)
+γ2‖u˜‖max (‖Θuuα‖)
)
≤
2u˜2
(
Tnun
m
− L+ γ1 max (‖Θuu‖)
+γ2 max (‖Θuuα‖)
)
≤
Tnun
m
− L+ γ1 max (‖Θuu‖)
+γ2 max (‖Θuuα‖) ≤ 0.
From this it is seen that the gain L should satisfy the
following inequality in order for the observer to be uniform
asymptotically stable
L ≥
Tnunmax
m
+ γ1 max (‖Θuu‖)+ γ2 max (‖Θuuα‖). (63)
Inserting the maximum value for the worst case the gain ends
up being
L ≥
Tnunmax + ̺Sumax (max (‖Θuu‖) + αmax (‖Θuuα‖))
m
.
(64)
The derivation above also holds for the case where Θuuα = 0.
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